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THE GRECO-MACEDONIAN DISPUTE 
OVER THE NAME OF THE REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA
The Republic of Macedonia is a state created following the dissolution of Yugoslavia in 1991. Constitutionally, it adopted its former Yugoslav-era name but dispen-
sed with the earlier qualifiers like ‘peoples’ and ‘socialist.’ On 16 April 1991, the 
Macedonian Parliament passed an amendment to the constitution, changing the 
name of the state to the Republic of Macedonia.1 As the Greek political scientist 
Aristotle Tziampiris has noted,2 the country’s leaders were surprised by Greece’s ne-
gative response to the name, a development that they had no way of foreseeing. Their 
claims may be justified in that Greece had not previously voiced any objections to 
their northern neighbour’s name of the ‘People’s Republic of Macedonia’ (later the 
Socialist Republic of Macedonia). Yet the founder of post-war Yugoslavia, Josip Broz 
Tito, managed to temper Macedonian ambitions in order to maintain unity in the 
country3 and good relations with neighbouring Greece. In 1954, Yugoslavia together 
1 The name of the state was confirmed in the new constitution of the Republic of Macedonia 
of 17 November 1991.
2 A. Tziampiris, ‘The Name Dispute in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia after the Signing 
of the Interim Accord’ in E. Kofos (ed.), Athens-Skopje: An Uneasy Symbiosis, Athens 2005, pp. 226-
-227.
3 Such threats existed right after World War II when Greece was engulfed in civil war and plans for 
a Balkan or Bulgaro-Yugoslav federation began to take real shape. For more on this subject, see Arhiv 
na Makedonija (AM) Skopje, fond: CK KPM, k.1, 427.4.30/206-218. Instructor Vlado Strugar in-
forms CK KPM on May 30, 1946, l.5 about VMRO activities in Strumica and nearby villages and 
about steps to be taken to combat it. We also learn about this organization from a report of a meet-
ing of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Macedonia, see AM, fond: CK KPM, 
k. 1, a.e. 29, l. 3, Zapisnik Br. 6, Sastanak CK KPM na 8 V 1947 god., “VMRO groups appear as 
central reactionary organizations […]. At present, there is no general VMRO organization for the 
whole of Macedonia, but that does not mean it cannot be created if we do not take appropriate 
action.” See also S. Ristevski, Sudeni za Makedonija (1945-1985), Ohrid 1995, p. 84f; R.L. Wolff, 
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with Greece and Turkey created the Balkan Pact.4 Today, as we ponder the causes of 
this ‘naming battle’ and its consequences, it is worth considering the arguments of 
both sides.
THE NOTION OF MACEDONIA IN RECENT HISTORY 
AND CONTEMPORARY DIPLOMACY
The notions of Macedonia and Macedonian appeared in the 1860’s as modern sta-
tes arose on the Balkan Peninsula. Macedonia’s political borders were drawn-up by 
the 1878 Berlin congress, when all the territory that remained under Turkish rule, 
except Albanian regions and Thrace, became known as Macedonia. The new Balkan 
states, hopeful to extend their territorial possessions, chose to describe their pro-
spective gains. It was a time when, next to the Greek ‘Mégla Idea,’ concepts sprang 
up of ‘Greater Serbia,’ ‘Greater Bulgaria,’ ‘Greater Albania’ which were at odds with 
the aspirations of the people inhabiting Macedonia. At first, the argument was pri-
marily between religious organizations: namely, between the Greek Patriarchate of 
Constantinople, which possessed a religious monopoly among local Christians; and 
Slavic religious organizations who wanted to break that monopoly, particularly the 
Bulgarian exarchate (a latter day practitioner of the medieval tradition of such con-
flict). The latter hierarchy, capitalizing on support from Slavic Orthodoxy in Russia, 
went from strength to strength and shortly before the First Balkan War succeeded in 
drawing the largest segment of the Slavic population in what was called Macedonia 
into the Bulgarian cultural circle. Bulgaria’s rival, modern Greece, kept fighting a lo-
sing battle. Then a third competitor appeared: the Serbian state, which, having po-
tential routes of expansion to the north and west (towards Bosnia and Herzegovina) 
blocked by Austria-Hungary in 1878, decided to focus on the only remaining direc-
tion – south into Macedonia. As a result, before the First Balkan War the notion of 
Macedonia was coterminous with the area inhabited mainly by southern Slavs, who 
were culturally and politically aligned with Bulgaria, and constantly battling a re-
treating Hellenism. Being a late arrival, Serbia commanded negligible influence in 
the area and, consequently, stood a lesser chance of winning the hearts of the Slavic 
masses in Macedonia.
The Balkans in Our Time, Cambridge (Mass.) 1974, p. 316; S. Troebst, Die bulgarisch-jugoslawische 
Kontroverse um Makedonien 1967-1982, München 1983; ‘Januarskite nastani na Skopsko kale 
– 1945’ in Zbornik na dokumenti vo izdanie na Arhivot na Makedonija, Skopje 1997; ‘Metodija 
Andonov-»ento’ in M. Dimitrijevski, Z. Todorovski, R. Bunteski-Bunte (eds.), Dokumenti i ma-
teriali, Skopje 2002; »ento. »ovek, revolucioner, dræavnik. Zbornik na materiali od Trkalezna masa 
odr`an na 26.11.1991 godina vo Prilep, Prilep 1993; R. Bunteski-Bunte, Metodija Andonov-«ento’ in 
Makedonski naroden tribun, Skopie 2002; «ento i makedonskata dr`avnost. Zbornik na trudovite od 
nau~niot sobir po povod 100-godi¡ninata od ra|aweto na Metodija Andonov-«ento, odr`an vo Skopje na 
16 i 17 dekemvri 2002 godina, Skopje 2004.
4 L. Georgievski, Ostvaruvawe na vekovniot son, Skopje 2001, pp. 17, 21, suggests that the Balkan 
Pact was unfavourable for Macedonia.
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In the 1860’s, when the word ‘Macedonia’ became common usage for a political 
concept that was applied to this particular territory, a tendency appeared that identi-
fied the national separateness of its Slavic inhabitants. The rising national awareness 
of Macedonians in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was partly in-
fluenced by cultural processes, but even more by the struggles against the Turks and 
conflicts with neighbouring Balkan states which tried to subsume Macedonia. In an 
attempt to secure Macedonian autonomy from Turkey, a revolutionary organization 
called VMRO (Vnatrešna makedonska revolucionerna organizacia) was established 
in 1893.5 Next to local partisans known as komiti and Bulgarian czeta units, there 
appeared andartes, fighters recruited from among the local Greeks or from the home 
country (in 1881, Greece was given the right by the Berlin congress to extend its ter-
ritory to include Thessaly, which made it a contiguous neighbour of the then Turkish 
Macedonia), and chetniks dispatched from Serbia or organized from those few local 
elements who leaned toward Serbia. This orientation was undoubtedly the least rep-
resented in Macedonia, the main struggle being between the supporters of Bulgarian 
and Greek aspirations. Gradually, the decade leading to 1903 became marked by 
a war of all against all in which komiti, chetniks, andartes attacked not only Turkish 
forces and administrators, but each other as well.
With war cries of ‘Macedonia for the Macedonians,’ an insurrection broke out on 
2 August 1903, on the feast of St. Elias (Ilia), for which reason it went down in histo-
ry as the Ilinden Uprising. Struggles were fought in three vilayets (provinces): Vitola, 
Saloniki, and Skopje, as well as in Andrianople in Thrace. Armed komiti forces won 
their greatest successes in Monastir (Bitola) vilayet, near the town of Kruševo, where 
5 The organization’s motto, fight for autonomy, is variously interpreted by historians. Most publica-
tions on the subject appeared in Macedonia and Bulgaria. K. Bitovski, Istorija na makedonskiot na-
rod, Skopje 2003, Vol. 3; B. Ristovski, Istorija na makedonskata nacija, Skopje 1999; M. Pandevski, 
Nacionalno pra{awe vo osloboditelnoto dvi`ewe, Skopje 1974; idem Makedonija na Balkanot XIV-XX 
istoriski koordinati, Skopje 1990; I. Katarxiev, Sto godini od formiraweto na VMRO, sto godini revolu-
cionerna tradicija, Skopje 1993; A. Hristov, VMRO i makedonskata dr`avnost 1893-1944 (Istorisko-
praven osvrt), Skopje 1993; V. Veskovi}-Vangeli, Borbata za nezavisna makedonska republika od 
Ilinden do ASNOM, Skopje 1995; D. Popovski, ‘Ilindenskata revolucija i Kru{evskata republika 
vo borbata na makedonskiot narod za nacionalno i socijalno osloboduvawe’ in A. Hristov (ed.), 
Prilozi za Ilinden, Kru{evo 1979, pp. 21-42; M. Apostolski (ed.), Razvitok na dr`avnosta na make-
donskiot narod, Skopje 1966; M. Apostolski (ed.), Ilinden 1903. Materiali od simpoziumot po povod 
65-godi{ninata od ilindenskoto vostanie odr`an na 27, 28 i 29 maj 1968 god. vo Ohrid, Skopje 1970; 
V. Veskovi}-Vangeli, Francuska revolucija i Kru{evskiot manifest 1903, Skopje 1993; G. Georgiev, 
J. Popov, Ilindenskoto v√stanie, Sofia 1969, p. 225; K. Pandev, ‘Programni iskania na VMRO do 
i po vreme na v†stanieto’ in X. Xristov (ed.), Ilindensko-Preobra`ensko v†stanie ot 1903 godina, Sofia 
1983, pp. 33-39; idem, Nacionalnoosvoboditelnotnoto dviæenie v Makedonija i Odrinsko 1878-1903, 
Sofia 2000, pp. 181-205; L. Panajotov, ‘Nacionalnoosvoboditelnoto dvi`enie na makedonskite 
B†lgari (1878-1918)’, B†lgaristika (Sofia) Vol. 5-6 (1990), pp. 19-32; V. Angelov, Makedonskata 
kÍrvava koleba, Sofia 2003; K. Karaka~anov, VMRO 110 godini borba za bÍlgarÈinata, Sofia 2004; 
S. Germanov, Ruskata obçestvenost i revolucionernoto dviæenie v Makedonia i Odrinsko 1893-1908, 
Sofia 1992. See also M. Glenny, The Balkans 1804-1999. Nationalism, War and the Great Powers, 
London 2000, pp. 205-216; G. Castellan, Histoire des Balkans (XIVe-XXe siècle), Paris 1991, 
pp. 350-362.
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a local authority and council were set up. Macedonian historiography often refers to 
the liberated area as the Kruševo Republic. The aims of the uprising were stated in 
the Kruševo Manifesto published in local dialect. Under a ‘Freedom or Death’ ban-
ner, autonomy was proclaimed for Macedonia and equal rights were promised to 
all inhabitants regardless of language or religion. Fighting continued for three more 
months with varying fortunes. On 4 August the insurrectionists captured the town 
of Klisura (near Kostur), where they operated until 27 August, and Neveska (now 
Nimfeon) near Lerin (Flôrina), which put up prolonged resistance. Attacks were 
mounted on railway lines, which disrupted transportation routes, bridges were de-
molished, Turkish garrisons were assaulted. The largest battle was fought for a gar-
rison in the village of Čaništa (near Prilepu). In the course of the Ilinden Uprising, 
the komiti stood out for their heroism and sacrifice.
As the uprising progressed, the Greeks together with their clergy sided with the 
Turks because of the predominantly Slavic composition of the insurrection, and fol-
lowing its collapse the Greek makedonomahi proved to be particularly hostile, and 
terrorized local people. The uprising received support from Bulgaria, causing dip-
lomatic conflict between Turkey and the Duchy of Bulgaria, which concluded with 
a treaty on 8 April 1904. Bulgaria had to promise not to interfere in Macedonian 
affairs, and Turkey confirmed its desire to introduce reforms in Saloniki, Monastir 
(Bitola), and Kosovo vilayets. At that time, the Slavs living in Macedonia were usu-
ally referred to as Bulgars. The term ‘Macedonian’ referred to an inhabitant of that 
land who pursued a political agenda, not as we understand the term today, a member 
of a South Slavic nation.
Given the weakness of the Macedonian revolutionary movement, often control-
led from the outside (by Bulgarians), the three neighbouring countries enjoyed much 
freedom of action. Macedonian separatist tendencies were not welcomed in Sofia or 
Belgrade, to say nothing of Athens. The three felt it necessary to form an alliance as 
they could not envisage room in the Balkans for yet another state – Macedonia.
In addition, the Macedonian liberation movement faced one more danger: rising 
Albanian nationalism whose leaders made serious claims to western Macedonia as 
part of ‘Greater Albania.’ It was the Albanian national movement that helped bring 
together Bulgaria, Montenegro, Greece, and Serbia, all fearing that Turkey would, as 
it had in the past, use Albanians against Slavs and Greeks, and they formed a Balkan 
League.
The two Balkan Wars ended in peace talks and the signing of a treaty in Bucharest 
on 10 August 1913. Northern and central Macedonia with Kumanovo, Skopje, Bitola, 
and Ohrid fell to Serbia (25,713 sq. km), while a larger southern part (34,203 sq. km) 
with Saloniki, Kostur (now Kastoría), Lerin (now Flôrina) was awarded to Greece, 
which thus extended its Aegean coast up to the river Mesta. Only an eastern portion 
of Macedonia with Gorna Dzhumaya and Petrich, at the time also with Strumica, 
was incorporated into Bulgaria (6,798 sq. km). Such a division of Macedonia, with 
only minor alterations (after World War I the Strumica region was awarded to the 
Kingdom of Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs), has remained in force until today.
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In a partitioned Macedonia, the new masters introduced their own laws and ig-
nored the wishes of the local population. Serbs called their acquisition South Serbia 
(Južna Srbija), and its inhabitants were designated in official terminology as South 
Serbians (južnosrbjanci). In Bulgaria, ‘Macedonia,’ continued to be used but the 
people were considered to be Bulgarians. After the Second Balkan War, Bulgaria es-
tablished close ties with Austria-Hungary and Germany and entered World War I in 
the hope of securing the dream of a ‘Greater Bulgaria’ which would also embrace 
Macedonia. Its alignment with the Central Powers brought about disastrous conse-
quences for Bulgaria and ended in another defeat.
THE CREATION OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA
The architect of the People’s Republic of Macedonia was Josip Broz Tito. It embra-
ced only one part of Macedonia, that which had been awarded to Serbia in 1913, the 
so-called Vardar Macedonia.
The decision to create a Macedonian republic within the Yugoslav state was tak-
en as early as 1943 in Jajce, a liberated area in Bosnia, during the second session of 
AVNOJ (Anti-Fascist Council of the National Liberation of Yugoslavia), the su-
preme representative and legislative body of the nations in Yugoslavia. A resolution 
of that session recognized that Serbian, Croatian, Slovenian, and Macedonian were 
equal languages in the entire Yugoslav territory, and that the state would be a fed-
eration which would also include a Macedonian republic. It was the first time in its 
history that the Macedonian language was recognized as an official language in any 
state, and Macedonia became part of a federal state on equal terms with all the other 
republics in the federation.
The Jajce provisions were confirmed on 2 August 1944 by ASNOM (Anti-
Fascist Council of National Liberation of Macedonia), which convened in Sv. Otec 
Prohor Pčinski monastery. The date was chosen to commemorate the outbreak of 
the Ilinden Uprising, which had become a symbol of the struggle for national lib-
eration. The act was tantamount to declaring that the Macedonians were a distinct 
people with their own history, language, and culture.
The people of Macedonia did not wholly accept those provisions, with con-
troversy erupting even during the ASNOM session. Separatist tendencies were 
riding high at that time, and threatened to upset order in Yugoslavia. Many voic-
es were heard demanding secession from the federation and the creation of a sep-
arate state. Representatives of the other ethnic groups in Macedonia were denied 
entry into the session; especially the Serbians and even those Macedonians who 
had lived in Serbia. The chief proponent of separatism was Metodija Andonov-
Čento.6 Plans for Macedonian unification and the establishment of a state relied 
6 »ento. »ovek, revolucioner, dræavnik…; R. Bunteski-Bunte, Metodija Andonov-«ento. Makedonski 
naroden tribun, Skopje 2002; «ento i makedonskata dr`avnost. Zbornik na trudovite…
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in part on plans for a Balkan federation and on the wider situation in the region 
before 1949.
THE MACEDONIAN MINORITY IN GREECE
When Greece acquired 51% of Macedonian territory in 1913, its ethnic composi-
tion differed from the present. As Greek statistics report, the Aegean Macedonian 
population was 43% Greek, with Turks and Slavs (today’s Macedonians) at 39% 
and 10% respectively, except that the Greek category included Slavs under the ju-
risdiction of the same Orthodox patriarchate as ethnic Greeks. If language is used as 
the sole criterion, the proportions would be different: 20-25% Greeks and 20-35% 
Slavs.7 Greek figures have been criticized by Macedonian, Bulgarian, and indepen-
dent scholars.8
Aegean (Greek) Macedonia lost its Slavic character as a result of the migrations 
after the First World War, which were mandated by the Bulgaro-Greek convention 
at Neuilly on 27 November 1919, on voluntary population exchanges, and after 
the Greco-Turkish War (1919-1922) and the subsequent convention concluded in 
Lausanne on 30 January 1923, on compulsory population exchanges between Turkey 
and Greece. In place of Macedonian Slavs (present-day Macedonians) who then left 
Greek Macedonia, the period 1913-1928 witnessed the settlement of Greeks from 
Bulgaria, Orthodox adherents from Turkey, and Greeks from Thessaly, Peloponnese, 
and Epirus. In this part of Macedonia, 618,199 people were settled in 1913-1928,9 
altering its ethnic composition. Lena Divani reports that Greece’s policies in the in-
terwar period led to coercive measures to Hellenize the province and its inhabitants. 
Such a policy reached a dramatic peak in 1936-41, when all topographic names as 
well as Macedonians’ given and family names were changed, and evening classes in 
Greek were made obligatory.10 As a result, Macedonians embraced the communist 
movement, which granted them nationality rights. Their support for communism 
7 D. Lithoksoou, Meionotika Zitimata kai Ethniki Syneidisi stin Ellada: Atasthalies tis Ellinikis 
Istoriografis, Athina 1991, p. 115. Similar data are quoted by G.B. Zotiades, The Macedonian 
Controversy, Thesaloniki 1961, p. 39.
8 S. Kiselinovski, I. Stavovi-Kavka, Malcinstvata na Balkanot (XX vek), Skopje 2004, p. 56, sug-
gests that the proportion of the non-Greek population in 1900 was 77.5%, with Greeks hav-
ing only 22.5%. Taking account of the whole Macedonian territory, Greeks only made up 9.8%. 
The figures quoted after: D.M. Brancoff, La Macedoine et sa population Chrétienne, Paris 1905, 
pp. 98-247, who estimates the percentage of Bulgarians at 68.9%, and Greeks at 24.1%. V. Kín~ov, 
MakedoniÔ. EtnografiÔ i statistika. Fototipno izdanie, SofiÔ 1996, pp. 136f, complied data in 1900 
suggesting that Greek Macedonia had 357,666 Bulgarians and 218,774 Greeks. For changes in the 
structure of the Macedonian population, see I. Stawowy-Kawka, ‘Ludność Macedonii – zmiany 
struktury narodowościowej w XX wieku’, Dzieje Najnowsze, Vol. 30, No. 2 (1998), pp. 27-41.
9 Statistica apotelesmata tisapografis tu plithizmu tis Elados 15-16 maiu 1928, Athina 1935, p. 12.
10 L. Divani, Ellada kai Meionotites: to systima diethnous prostasias tis Koinonias ton Ethnon, Athen 1995, 
p. 345, see also S. Kiselinovski, Etni~kite promeni vo Makedonija (1913-1995), Skopje 2000.
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would cost them dearly after the civil ended: about 35,000 Macedonians fled from 
Greece in 1948 and 1949; their property was then confiscated.11 After World War II, 
Greece hardened its attitude towards the ‘Macedonian question’:
– Macedonia is a geographical concept referring to a specific region. The notion 
of Macedonia, therefore, points to a regional rather than national origin;
– The three parts of Macedonia that were divided in 1912 and 1913 exhibit no 
unifying qualities, either economically, or ethnically, or linguistically;
– There is no distinct Macedonian nationality.12
At present, the number of Macedonians in Greece is estimated at 150,000.13 The 
Greeks argue this figure is an exaggeration. Local authorities’ estimates of Slavic in-
habitants they call Slavophones (the term was coined in the interwar period) speak of 
50,000 to 100,000. The number is fluid as censuses do not list them as a distinct ethnic 
group since Macedonians in Greece are denied this status. The situation is made more 
complex because not all members of this community have a strongly developed sense of 
Macedonian identity. Some – a majority – have assimilated and only declare that they 
have a distinct language, but do not aspire to the status of a national minority. Others 
admit to having only a local Slavo-Macedonian nationality (Slavomakedones), rather 
than a Greek or Macedonian nationality, and only a small percentage identify with the 
present nation of the Republic of Macedonia (these call themselves Makedones).14
According to Evangelos Kofos, what is controversial is not the existence of a Slavic 
group in northern Greece, or denials of this fact, but references to concepts of ‘mi-
nority,’ ‘language,’ and ‘nation’ as being Macedonian. Kofos writes: ‘[…] the prob-
lem lies not in the fact that people of Slavic origin want […] to function as an 
ethnic or national minority; it lies in the name they have chosen – Makedones in 
Greek – as those who reside in Greece chose to describe themselves.’15 To agree to 
such an understanding of the name Makedonos would be tantamount to stripping 
two million Greeks in the northern part of the country, the province Macedonia, 
of their regional identity. To Greeks, Macedonia is a Greek idea, the homeland of 
Alexander the Great, a Greek, and a pupil of Aristotle. They do not mind the fact 
that during the Macedonian expansion Athenians did not welcome this powerful 
11 Arhiv na Makedonija, fond. br. 996, k.- IV/3/21, Izve{taj za repatijacja na emigracjata.
12 N.P. Andriotes, The Federative Republic of Skopje and Its Language, Athens 1966; W. Kofos, 
Nationalism and Communism in Macedonia, Thessaloniki 1964; G.B. Zotiades, The Macedonian 
Controversy, Thessaloniki 1961; Macedonia. Past and Present, reprints from Balkan Studies, 
Thessaloniki 1992.
13 Macedonian historians estimate the number of Macedonian speakers in Greek Macedonia 
at 240,000, see S. Kiselinovski, Etni~kite…, p. 48. H.J. Axt, ‘Mazedonien: ein Streit um Namenoder 
ein Konflikt vor dem Asbruch?’, Europa Archiw. Zeitschrift für Internationale Politik, 10 February 
1993, p. 68, reports the number of Macedonians in Greece as between 150,000 and 300,000.
14 GHM, Minority Rights Group – Greece (MRG – G), ‘Report about Compliance with the Principles 
of the Framework Convention for the Protection of the National Minorities’, at <www.greekhel-
sinki.gr>, p. 2.
15 E. Kofos, ‘The Unresolved “Difference over the Name”: A Greek Perspective’ in E. Kofos (ed.), 
Athens-Skopje…, p. 132.
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ruler. Demosthenes called Alexander’s father Philip II a barbarian, which is still used 
today by Slavic Macedonians as an argument against considering the land as be-
ing Greek. They point to the battle of Cheronea, when Athenians and other Greek 
states accepted briefly Philip II’s domination in Macedonia; and note that during 
Alexander’s Asian expedition, the Greek states only participated because they had no 
other option. Yet the ethos of the struggle for Macedonia in the early twentieth cen-
tury is deeply engraved in Greeks’ national memory.
From the perspective of the Greeks, the ‘Macedonian problem’ exists only in 
terms of a Slavic people appropriating their history, culture, tradition, and especially 
the name Macedonia. They therefore readily use a replacement term, the Republic 
of Skopje, for their northern neighbour, Skopjans for its inhabitants, Skopjan for 
its media or the cultural goods produced there. Greek politicians, journalists, schol-
ars go so far as to replace the ‘Macedonian problem’ with ‘Skopjan problem’ (to 
Skopiano) coined in the early 1990’s. For most Greeks, the Republic of Macedonia 
is an ‘artificial state’ which is bound to descend into oblivion unless the Skopje au-
thorities change their policy.16
In Greece, the terms Macedonia and Macedonians are reserved for the inhabit-
ants of Greek (Aegean) Macedonia, while their use by northern neighbours is an er-
roneous combination of a Slavic element with an antique culture. Kofos argues that 
the roots and language of ancient Macedonians were unquestionably Hellenic, and 
the present-day Skopje area was not part of the Macedonian Empire at the time of 
Philip of Macedon. In 1992, the Greek post office issued stamps with ancient and 
Byzantine relics in Macedonia and the phrase ‘Macedonia always was and will be 
Greek.’17 The slogan can be seen throughout northern Greece on posters displayed 
in virtually all of region’s cities.
It is not for this paper to try to determine who has more right to use the name 
Macedonia. Yet one cannot ignore the consequences of these still unsettled interna-
tional issues for those citizens of Greece who call themselves Macedonians (and who 
the Greeks refer to as Slavophones), and for the post-civil war emigrants. Discord over 
this issue has a negative impact upon Macedonian associations and organizations, to 
which the Greeks deny minority status. After the Greek civil war, Macedonians who 
emigrated were stripped of citizenship on the grounds of article 19 of the Citizenship 
Code, which was not wholly rescinded until 1998. In 1982, Athens made it possible 
for Greeks (not Macedonians) who had taken part in the civil war on the commu-
nist side to be repatriated. According to Dimistris Christopopulos and Konstantionos 
Tsitselikis,18 this was done in order to make only Greeks eligible; the effect was to ex-
16 A.N. Kounadis, ‘To makedoniko zitima kai I elliniki oligoria’, Kathimerina, 3 July 2005, at <www.
kathimerini.gr>.
17 E. Kofos, ‘Greece’s Macedonian Adventure: The Controversy over FYROM’s Independence and 
Recognition’ in V. Coufoudakis, H. Psomiades, A. Gerolymastos (eds.), Greece and the New Balkans. 
Challenges and Opportunities, New York 1999, p. 365.
18 D. Christopoulos, K. Tsitselikis, ‘Treatment of Minorities and omogeneis in Greece: Relics and 
Challenges’, at <www.kemo.gr>.
This content downloaded from 
            149.156.234.28 on Fri, 16 Oct 2020 10:47:52 UTC              
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
231POLITEJA 2/1(10/1)/2008 The Greco-Macedonian…
clude the Macedonian minority – that is, those declaring themselves to be Macedonians. 
Such practices apply to people coming from Greece who are not ethnic Greeks, which 
violates the constitutional equality of citizens and Greece’s obligations under the pro-
tection of national minority rights. Those that possess Macedonian passports or pass-
ports of third-party states often find it difficult to enter Greece.
A number of categories and criteria were developed to discriminate between 
people; these largely determine whether a given person stands a chance of recover-
ing citizenship. Nor are the discriminatory policies of the Greek authorities limited 
to hindering re-naturalization or such simple issues as the possibility of visiting 
family members, birthplace, etc. Associations for culture, education, promotion of 
the Macedonian cultural heritage, contacts with Skopje are all viewed with hostil-
ity. Theoretically, all such organizations enjoy constitutional guarantees of freedom, 
but in reality any mention of Macedonian affiliation meet with open disapproval 
or even repression, and not only from officials, but also from Greek society. The of-
ficially registered (since 1994) Macedonian political party is Vinožito (Rainbow), 
which was formerly a cultural organization. It is accused of separatist tendencies, 
unlawful appropriation of the name Macedonia, and that it desires the separation 
from Greece of the province which possesses that name. When it displayed on its 
office a sign in Macedonian, it was set on fire. Organizations for minority rights 
report cases of local authorities exerting pressure to hinder Macedonians’ access to 
the media, such as in the case of the few titles like Ta Moylena and Zora (hints were 
dropped to the printers that they were lacking in patriotism and collaborating with 
Skopje agents).
Activists for Macedonian minority rights include the Greek clergyman 
Archimandrite Nikodimos Tsarknias. As a leader of the Movement for the Defence 
of Macedonians’ Rights in Greece, which demanded that the minority be allowed 
to preserve its culture, tradition, and language, he was punished by the Bishop of 
Flôrina, who relieved him of his duties for disobedience and for publications in the 
Ta Moylena newspaper. He was later briefly reinstated, only to be discharged again 
in 1993. Subsequently Tsarknias joined the Macedonian Church, was stigmatized 
for being schismatic, and received multiple convictions for unlawful performance of 
priestly duties and the wearing of a cassock.19
MACEDONIAN STATEHOOD AND THE DISPUTE OVER ITS NAME
The referendum in which the people of the Socialist Republic of Macedonia chose to 
create a sovereign state took place on 8 September 1991. The turnout was 63.32% 
of the population, with Albanians (over 23% of the population) boycotting the bal-
19 The court argued that as a Greek citizen, Tsarknias could not claim to be a member of a non-
Greek church. During the trial he heard abusive shouts like ‘Traitor!’, ‘Disgrace!’, ‘Defender of 
foreign homeland’. See US State Department, International Religious Freedom Report 2005. Greece, 
at <www.state.gov/g/drl/irf/2005>.
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lot. An overwhelming majority (95.08%) of voters supported independence. On 17 
September the parliament heard a declaration confirming the people’s consent to 
establish a sovereign republic, after which on 17 November the constitution of the 
Republic of Macedonia was adopted. President Kiro Gligorov solemnly declared the 
establishment of the Republic of Macedonia on 20 November 1991.
The preamble to the constitution cited the Macedonians’ historical aspi-
rations20 to their own statehood and stated that the Republic of Macedonia is 
a ‘[…] nation state of the Macedonian people which safeguards the body of law to 
achieve equality of all citizens and lasting coexistence of the Macedonian people 
with Albanians, Turks, Koutsovlachs, Gypsies, and other nationalities inhabiting 
the Republic…’21
The constitution of the newly created state resulted in a series of controversies 
in Athens. On 29 November 1991, the Greek government spokesman Emanuel 
Kalamidas said, ‘The new constitution of the Republic of Macedonia is a “multi-
ple provocation.” It does not guarantee the inviolability of borders, arouses territo-
rial claims against Greece, and opens the problem of the existence of a Macedonian 
minority in Greece.’22 Soon afterwards, on 4 December 1991, Athens laid down its 
first conditions for the recognition of the Republic of Macedonia. ‘It may not use 
the name Macedonia, as this has only a purely geographic rather than ethnic signifi-
cance. It must also guarantee that it makes no territorial claims to our country. It 
must further acknowledge that there is no “Macedonian minority” in Greece.’23
The greatest controversy was coused by constitutional clauses which had already 
been introduced as amendment LVIII to the constitution of the Socialist Republic of 
Macedonia on 20 September 1990, which said, ‘The Socialist Republic of Macedonia 
cares for the status and rights of that part of the Macedonian nation who live in 
neighbouring countries, attends to the needs of Macedonians in other countries, 
persons displaced from Macedonia, and citizens working temporarily outside the 
country, supports them, assists their development, and helps maintain contact with 
them…’24
Such provisions were sustained in the Republic of Macedonia constitution of 
17 November 1991, as clause 49. Clause 3, which only stated that the territory of 
the Republic is indivisible, its borders permanent and inviolable, did not persuade 
the Greeks that these provisions gave them sufficient guarantees with regard to their 
own borders. On the contrary, such provisions were interpreted as expressing a desire 
to interfere in Greece’s internal affairs and to pursue territorial expansion.
20 The preamble cites historical, cultural, and state-building traditions of the Macedonian people, 
i.e., Kruševska Republika (created during the the Ilinden Uprising), ASNOM decisions, the func-
tioning of the republic when part of the Yugoslav Federation, and the referendum of 8 September 
1991, when the Macedonians decided to establish a sovereign state.
21 Ustav na Republika Makedonija, Skopje 1991, p. 3.
22 A. Tuntev, Republika Makedonija. Prva dekada (1990-1999), Skopje 2005, p. 252.
23 Ibid.
24 Slu`ben vesnik na SRM, br. 28 od 21 septemvri 1990 godina.
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Greek protests were addressed by the Macedonian parliament in a declaration of 
17 September 1991, which stated, ‘The Republic of Macedonia will effect its poli-
cies based on international law and their chief aim will be the recognition of and 
respect for fundamental human rights and liberties, including the rights and liber-
ties of Macedonians who live in neighbouring countries as a national minority. The 
Republic of Macedonia understands that it is a problem to be resolved solely by peace-
ful and democratic means and in the spirit of European and civilized standards.’25
The president of the Republic of Macedonia, despite the objections of the then 
majority ruling party VMRO-DPMNE, succeeded in enacting two amendments to 
the constitution in order to appease the Greeks. The amendments were adopted on 
6 January 1992. They applied to articles 3 and 49. Article 3 was supplemented with 
two sentences:
1. The Republic of Macedonia makes no territorial claims against any of its neigh-
bouring countries.
2. The borders of the Republic of Macedonia may be altered only in accordance with 
the Constitution and based on the good will and in harmony with commonly accepted 
international law.
Article 49, which is devoted to the rights of the Macedonian minority and dis-
placed Macedonians, was amended with: ‘In order to see this status accomplished, 
the Republic of Macedonia will not interfere in the sovereign rights of other states or 
in their internal affairs.’26 The Greek government welcomed these assurances from 
Macedonia, although it still was not fully satisfied. It was pointed out that allowing 
for changes in borders while excluding territorial losses does not imply the renuncia-
tion of new acquisitions. Besides, no amendments had been made to the preamble, 
which continued to cause concern in Greece.
For the young Republic of Macedonia, it was vital that it obtain recognition in 
the international arena; with this in mind, its politicians acted as one in co-operating 
with the European Community. The Macedonian parliament issued a special declara-
tion in which it stated that the Republic of Macedonia would guarantee the rights of 
national minorities on its territory in compliance with the United Nations Charter. 
The same declaration was sent to the Arbitration Committee for Yugoslavia, the so-
called Badinter Committee,27 which decided on 11 January 1992, that Macedonia, 
like Slovenia, met the terms for international recognition.
This opinion was not shared by Greece, which offered firm resistance as it tried 
to prevent Macedonia’s entry into the international arena. From that point onwards, 
negotiations began to develop a compromise formula.
President Gligorov’s policy of concessions and negotiations resulted in some suc-
cess. But Greece did not relent: apart from using the name ‘Macedonia’ as the offi-
25 ‘Deklaracja za suverena i samostojna Republika Makedonija, usvojena od Sobranieto na RM na 
17 septemvri 1991 godina (po referendumot)’ in A. Tuntev, Republika Makedonija…, p. 75.
26 Konstitucja na Republika Makedonija, Skopje 1991, pp. 5, 6, 20.
27 The committee was named after Robert Badinter, its chairman, an expert in constitutional law.
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cial title of the state, they were also concerned about Macedonia adopting for their 
state emblem and flag the Vergina sun borrowed from the tomb of Philip II in an-
cient Aigai (now Vergina). The Greeks persisted in trying to make the Skopje gov-
ernment change the design. Thousands demonstrated in Saloniki and Athens against 
the Republic. Greece’s veto delayed recognition of the Republic of Macedonia by 
international bodies, like the UN and European Union countries.
Actions and speeches made by the Macedonian president, Kiro Gligorov, that 
were imbued with compromise, were often criticized by the co-ruling Social-
Democratic Union of Macedonia (SDSM),28 the majority party VMRO-DPMNE 
(VMRO – Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity).29 The latter party 
embraced a strongly nationalistic agenda, which served to antagonize Greece. The 
public pronouncements of its leader, Georgievski, did not help: ‘[…] we see hope 
in Macedonia one day being united’; ‘We want to study in depth the civil war in 
Greece, during which 30,000 Macedonians died, a far greater loss than the SR of 
Macedonia suffered in World War II.’30 President Gligorov’s concessions were met 
with accusations of treason.
Meanwhile, Greece was persuading the EU of the merits of its position on 
Macedonia, and President Karamanlis stressed that Skopje ‘[…] does not have 
any right, whether historical or ethnological, to use the name Macedonia.’31 At 
a European Council summit meeting in Lisbon on 26-27 June 1992, it was decided 
that the Republic of Macedonia would be recognized ‘[…] under a name which did 
not have the word Macedonia in it.’ This position was criticized by the Skopje gov-
ernment, and the parliament passed on 3 June a declaration which said, ‘The name 
Macedonia is a fundamental description of the Macedonian nation, which consti-
tutes a majority in the Republic of Macedonia, and to deny its existence is to dis-
criminate against it […]’32
In January 1993, the Greek foreign minister, Michalis Papakonstantinou, issued 
a memorandum to the UN in which he presented arguments against admitting the 
Republic of Macedonia into the organization. He accused Skopje of trying to mo-
nopolize the name Macedonia when the state comprised only 38.5% of Macedonian 
territory, which is only a small proportion when compared to the Greek part of 51%. 
He also warned that Greece would not allow the Macedonian flag to fly on the UN 
building, as it used the theme of the Vergina sun (a 16-point starburst).
To prevent the conflict from escalating, on 9 April 1993, the Republic of Macedonia 
became the 181st state to be admitted to the UN, but because of Greek protests, 
28 Social-Democratic Union of Macedonia is the name the party adopted in April 1991; it was pre-
viously named SKM-PDP (League of Communists of Macedonia – Party of the Democratic 
Transition). It was headed from 1992 by Branko Crvenkovski, a former prime minister.
29 VMRO-DPMNE, the party was created on 17 June 1990, headed by Ljubčo Georgievski. It claimed 
to locate itself in the tradition of the Ilinden Uprising and VMRO activities back in 1903.
30 L. Georgievski, Ostvaruvawe…, pp. 14, 20.
31 E. Kofos, ‘The Unresolved…’, p. 129.
32 Clu`ben vesnik na Republika Makedonija br. 08-2812/2, 3 juli 1992 god, Skopje.
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its admission was under the name of the ‘Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’ 
(FYROM). Resolution 817 (1993) stressed that the country met the conditions for 
membership in the UN, but it indicated that a difference of opinion concerning its 
name needed to be resolved. In the words of President Gligorov, ‘the admission of 
Macedonia into an international organization like the UN as an equal member will 
help her attain a wholly new status in talks about her recognition by all countries.’33
Realizing the failure of its policy (all EU countries apart from Greece recognized 
Macedonia), Athens34 decided on 16 February 1994 to apply an economic blockade 
and closed the port of Saloniki to Macedonian supplies, including, most notably, oil. 
Only then did it become clear how important Macedonia’s links with its other neigh-
bours were: Albania and Bulgaria, and also another Balkan country, Turkey.
A breakthrough in Greco-Macedonian relations came on 13 September 1995, 
with the signing in New York of a temporary accord (for seven years).35 The docu-
ment does not mention the parties’ names, designating them as the first and the sec-
ond party. The first party (Greece) committed itself to recognizing the second party 
(the Republic of Macedonia) as an independent and sovereign state. Both parties 
recognized their present borders as being permanent and unchangeable, confirmed 
their mutually open status, and renounced territorial claims. They also pledged to 
observe human rights.
Thus after four years of conflict between Greece and Macedonia, mutual rela-
tions were normalized. The accord was signed at the UN headquarters by Foreign 
Minister Karolos Papoulias for Greece and Prime Minister Stevo Crvenkovski for 
Macedonia, in the presence of UN negotiator Cyrus Vance. Under its terms, Greece 
agreed to recognize the new state and lift the economic blockade, and Macedonia 
would give up its emblem, the 16-pointed sun of Vergina, and to remove from its 
constitution articles referring to Macedonian claims to the Greek province by the 
same name. The Macedonian parliament passed a law on 5 October 1995, chang-
ing the state’s emblem and flag. Greece lifted its 19-month long unilateral economic 
embargo in October 1995.
It should be emphasized that normalization was achieved after many months of 
mediation by UN and American officials. In January 1996 diplomatic relations were 
established between both countries, and on 27 February 1996, embassies were opened 
in Skopje and Athens respectively. Yet all was not rosy. Greece still did not recog-
nize the republic’s name, the existence of the Macedonian nation, or a Macedonian 
minority on its own territory. Additionally, violations of the Macedonian Republic’s 
airspace by Greeks, such as on 23 August 1994, and 27 March 1997 adversely af-
fected mutual relations.
33 For more on this subject, see C. Chiclet, ‘Pourquoi la Grèce a peur de la Macédoine’ in C. Chiclet, 
B. Lory (eds.), La Républiqe de Macédoine. Nouvelle venue dans le concert européen, Paris 1998, 
pp. 93-103.
34 Characteristically, on 1 January 1994, Greece concluded its EU presidency.
35 For the text of the document, see A. Tuntev, Republika Makedonija…, pp. 355-361.
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Although talks concerning the name were not suspended, they progressed slug-
gishly and ineffectually. In March 1997, Skopje hosted Greece’s foreign minister, 
Theodoros Pangalos. He gave notice that unless an accord was reached, Greece might 
hinder Macedonia’s accession into NATO and the EU. Only then did President Kiro 
Gliogorov, in an interview for the Greek To Vima newspaper, admit that he was pre-
pared to accept a ‘dual name’ formula. This would entail Macedonia using its consti-
tutional name at home and internationally, while Greece, ‘if it is not ready to accept 
the name, may call the country in any way it chooses.’36 Negotiations continued and 
seemed to promise a satisfactory conclusion. As Kofos relates, in 1998 both parties 
were close to accepting the Vance-proposed Republic of Macedonia-Skopje.37 The 
constitutional name would remain intact, and only in international and bilateral 
relations with Greece would the double-barrel name apply. The plan was revived 
in 1999. The United States encouraged progress in the talks because, before it pro-
ceeded to bomb Yugoslavia, it wanted all controversial issues in adjacent territories 
resolved. Yet American pressure was not too strong as Washington, while preparing 
to intervene in Kosovo, wanted to induce Skopje to co-operate, which undermined 
Macedonian-Serbian relations. In the summer 1998, the Republic of Macedonia 
agreed to co-operate with NATO in operation Joint Guarantor by allowing NATO 
rapid deployment forces into its territory.38
The Macedonians’ greatest fear was that they would be pressurised into accepting 
a geographical-related name, such as the Republic of Skopje, or the Central Balkan 
Republic, or the Republic of Wardar, or the Independent Republic of Skopje, etc.; 
or one including the word Macedonia with a qualifier, like Upper Macedonia, or 
North Macedonia, or New Macedonia. Were this to happen, it would preclude the 
notion of a Macedonian nation; there would only be Upper Macedonian, North 
Macedonian, etc. The Macedonians wanted a name derived from the territory on 
which their state is based – from Macedonia, ‘as it arose within a historical space 
(Macedonia) and in a historical evolutionary process (name, nation).’39 Early in 
2001, negotiations gravitated towards the use of the name Gorna Makedonija (Upper 
Macedonia) in two words, or simply Gornamakedonija as one word. Greek sourc-
es have suggested that this name for the purpose of conducting international rela-
tions was agreed to by Prime Minister Georgievski and the leader of the opposition 
Banko Crvenkovski. Opposition to such agreement was voiced by President Boris 
Trajkovski, who stated, ‘[…] the name [of a country] is part of national identity, 
a question that is the most important of all, a matter of pride and dignity.’40 A sur-
vey conducted on 16-17 February 2001, showed that people were deeply opposed 
36 K. Gligorov, ‘The Neighbour’, To Vima, 29 June 1997.
37 E. Kofos, ‘The Unresolved…’, p. 159.
38 For the Republic of Macedonia relations with neighbouring states, see I. Stawowy-Kawka, Historia 
Macedonii, Wrocław–Warszawa–Kraków 2000, pp. 306-314.
39 S. Kiselinovski, ‘Istoriska legitimnost’, Nova Makedonija, 25 February 2003.
40 ‘Disturbances in FYROM over the Name’, Macedonian Press Agency, 14 February 2001.
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to a referendum on name change which would offer two options: The Republic of 
North Macedonia or Upper Macedonia. More than 90% of respondents were op-
posed to both names, while 76.7% of Albanians asked were against such changes. 
Only 2.4% of the Republic’s citizens conceded to a name change, while 76.9% de-
clared that should a Greco-Macedonian agreement be signed, they would demand 
that it be rescinded and that the cabinet resign.41 The government could not count 
on popular support in this matter despite a major threat posed by Albanians in 2001, 
and resolving the conflict with Athens, it turned out, was not an option.
In 2001 the Albanians unexpectedly rebelled in the Republic of Macedonia, and 
took up arms to fight for their rights. US and EU mediators, James Pardew and 
Francois Leotard, jettisoned the pro-Macedonian policy, as they were aware of the 
danger of the region being destabilized, and induced the Macedonian government 
to sign an agreement (the Ohrid Accord of 31 August 2001) in which it accepted 
almost all of the Albanian demands. It did not concede – as had been suggested in 
the Accord42 – the creation of the Republic of Macedonia as an independent, civic, 
sovereign state under law in which all citizens are equal. For years after the war, the 
Republic had painstakingly reconstructed the history of its nation, territory, lan-
guage, and culture. For this reason, it was considered crucial to introduce into the 
constitutional preamble a statement of the national Macedonian character of the 
state. Such a statement was entered after the constitutional change of 2001,43 with 
no opposition from the Albanians.
The crisis had an impact on the agreement with Greece. American and EU poli-
ticians felt that the compromise the Macedonians accepted vis-à-vis the Albanians 
deserved a reward and they tried to persuade Athens to take a more lenient stand 
in the naming dispute. On the other hand, the Greeks knew how difficult it would 
be to force the introduction of more constitutional amendments in a short period 
of time. Resolving the name problem would have a positive, consolidating effect on 
Macedonian society and help it regain a lost sense of security. When the parliament 
had ratified the main points of the Ohrid Accord, the United States recognized the 
name the Republic of Macedonia in mutual relations. At present, Macedonia is rec-
ognized under this name by 120 states including the US, China, Russia, and Poland. 
But in the UN, NATO, and the EU, the appellation in use is still FYROM.
The Macedonian government found support in its involvement in the South-
East European Cooperation Process (SEECP), and in the signing of an Agreement 
on Stabilization and Affiliation with the EU in Luxembourg on 9 April 2001. By 
December 2005, the Republic of Macedonia had met the conditions for EU mem-
bership negotiations. These, however, did not make any progress, while Athens 
and Skopje both engaged in an exchange of malevolent gestures which were hardly 
conducive to harmony. In 2005 Greece refused to admit a plane that was marked 
41 Ibid., see also Dnevnik, 19 February 2001.
42 Framework Agreement, at <http: crisis.vmacedonia.com/doc/fagreeme.htm>.
43 Ustav na Republika Makedonija, Skopje 2001, p. 5.
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‘Republic of Macedonia,’ carrying the Macedonian president to Athens. He then 
cancelled the visit. At the 62nd session of the UN General Assembly, the Macedonian 
foreign minister, Sergam Kerin, was named its chairman. According to the provi-
sions of resolution 817 (1993), he was to discharge his function as a representative of 
FYROM, but his official letter of thanks for his election and the cover of his speech 
released to the media bore the name Republic of Macedonia. In addition to this, the 
domestic airport in Skopje was named after Alexander the Great. Such incidents did 
not help to develop dialogue with Greece.
Greco-Macedonian naming talks resumed more vigorously in 2008. Greece had 
warned Skopje that unless an agreement was reached, it would veto Macedonia’s 
admission to NATO. UN negotiator Matthew Nimetz proposed five names: 
Democratic Republic of Macedonia, Constitutional Republic of Macedonia, 
Independent Republic of Macedonia, Republic of Upper Macedonia, Republic of 
New Macedonia. None of them were accepted. At a NATO summit in Bucharest on 
3-4 April 2008 as a result of a Greek protest, Macedonia was not invited to join the 
organisation until the name dispute was resolved. In this case, the Greek veto proved 
to be effective, given the transparent lack of support for Macedonia from among the 
remaining allies.
Macedonia persists in its efforts to resolve the issue in a dialogue with Greece. In 
November it filed a complaint against Greece to the International Court of Justice. 
In it, Skopje accused Athens of hindering Macedonia’s accession into NATO and 
other international organizations. As late as September 2007, Prime Minister Kostas 
Karamanlis argued that Greece would not stand in the way of FYROM joining the 
EU if it stopped insisting on accession under its constitutional name. Otherwise 
Athens would reject its membership application.44
Although both capitals, Athens and Skopje, have declared a desire to seek com-
promise, their confrontational, inflexible positions have effectively prevented an un-
derstanding being reached.
Translated by Tadeusz Stanek
44 ‘Report by Khiotis: I Never Used the Word Veto’, To Vima, 11 September 2007.
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Professor Irena STAWOWY-KAWKA is a director of the Department of Contem-
porary History at the Institute of Political Science and International Relations of 
the Jagiellonian University. Her main interests include contemporary history, es-
pecially the history of the Balkans and the Balkan nations, politics of great powers 
(especially Great Britain and Germany) in East-Central and South-East Europe, and 
above all the history of the Macedonian problem and Macedonia. She is the au-
thor of about 150 publications published in Poland and abroad, and the editor of 
a few books and the yearly Works of the Commission on Central Europe of the Polish 
Academy of Arts and Sciences. She conducted her research in the archives of Skopje, 
Sophia, London, Bonn and Munich. In 2001-2008 she was the head of the Institute 
of Political Science and International Relations of the Jagiellonian University. She 
is a vice chairman of the Commission on Central Europe of the Polish Academy of 
Arts and Sciences, a member of the Krakow Branch of the History Commission of 
the Polish Academy of Science and a member of the Political Science Association; 
since 2002 a chairman of the Commission of Contemporary Slavic History at the 
International Committee of Slavists; a member of the Polish-Bulgarian Historical 
Committee at the Institute of History of the Polish Academy of Science.
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